Hong Kong, October 5 (ANI):
China’s first overseas military base was set up in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa in 2017, but it now also has access to two bases in Southeast Asia. One is a naval facility in Cambodia, and the latest revelation is of a newly built air base in neighbouring Laos.
The news of the Laos base came as a surprise, with China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) revealing its existence on 29 September 2026. It stated on social media that “the China-Laos Joint Support and Training Center at Ban Keun Airport in Laos and the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy officially went into operation”.
An official ceremony was graced by Laotian Defense Minister Khamlieng Outhakayson. Incidentally, the opening of the new base comes after Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith visited Beijing to meet Chairman Xi Jinping in June. On that occasion, Xi called for strategic dialogue on a number of issues, such as national defence.
With grid coordinates of 18.36043°N 102.56424°E, this air base in Ban Keun is approximately 50km north of the Laotian capital, Vientiane. The airfield was once home to Lima Site 44, part of a network of airbases built by the US military and CIA during the Vietnam War. Laos is one of the poorest countries in Asia.
The site was converted from farmland, and construction seemed to start late last year. The base features a 2,000m-long paved runway, as well as a taxiway, a parking apron, an air traffic control tower, and five hangars at its northern end. Most of the supporting infrastructure is in place, although works are still ongoing.
The MND’s announcement continued: “The two institutions, jointly maintained and operated by both sides, aim to help Laos strengthen the training of its air force pilots. The establishment and operation of the two institutions reflect mutual respect and equal consultation between China and Laos, aligning with domestic laws of both countries, as well as international law and common practices.”
China’s military said the base is “not directed against any third party” and that it “aims to help further deepen practical cooperation between the two militaries and contribute to maintaining peace and stability in the region.”
As for not being directed against a “third party”, the country most alarmed by this development will be Vietnam. China instigated an invasion of Vietnam in 1979. This airbase gives the PLA a foothold some 400km farther south into the Indochina Peninsula than its existing southwestern border. The location is also due west of Vietnam. This means China can use it to exert influence deep in Indochina.
The Lao People’s Liberation Army Air Force (LPLAAF) is small, comprising a mix of Russian-built and Chinese-built aircraft and helicopters. Sourced from China, the air force possesses single MA60 and MA600 transport aircraft, four Z-9 helicopters, five LE500 turboprop basic trainers and a quartet of K-8W jet trainers/light attack aircraft. The LPLAAF has two primary air bases: one is at Vientiane-Wattay International Airport, and the other at Xiengkhouang to the northeast.
With such a diminutive air force, it would appear the LPLAAF’s training requirements are not great. Of course, China will be keen to wean Laos off Russian equipment entirely and to supply its own aircraft and weapons. Such a move creates long-term dependencies, which will enable Beijing to exert further pressure.
In typical fashion, China did not disclose what assets, aircraft platforms or personnel numbers would deploy to Laos. However, one source suggested the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will base JL-8 jet trainers at the new Ban Keun facility, alongside relocated Laotian K-8Ws.
A key question is the legal arrangements and terms governing PLA access to Ben Keun Air Base. Presumably the PLA needs the host’s permission to use the airfield outside of any existing commitments, though this does not prevent Beijing from putting pressure on Vientiane to achieve its wishes.
The China-Global South Project (CGSP) quoted Junwu Ciweimian, the author of a popular Chinese military commentary account. He cited two reasons for the PLA choosing to set up at Ban Keun. “First is transportation. Ban Keun lies along the China-Laos Railway corridor, making it easier to move personnel and equipment from China. Second is geography. Ban Keun is close to the capital, making it convenient for trainees and easier for the Lao government to manage. The surrounding area is also relatively flat, compared with much of mountainous Laos, making it better suited for an airfield and flight training.”
Junwu also identified three purposes for the facility. The first is training the LPLAAF, and providing ample room for China to exert influence. “With the establishment of the joint aviation academy, the course is essentially set for the Lao air force’s future equipment to become fully Chinese-made.”
Secondly, CGSP quoted: “China already regularly conducts air exercises in the region, including annual joint drills with Thailand. Ban Keun could provide another operating location for Chinese aircraft. Rather than moving every aircraft directly to Thailand, the account suggested, China could leave some at Ban Keun and conduct exercises using two bases, making the training ‘closer to actual combat’.”
The third reason relates to regional influence. “Ban Keun also occupies a favourable strategic position. Several important cities in mainland Southeast Asia are roughly 500 to 700 kilometres away, while even the more distant ones are only a little over 1,000 kilometres from the facility. Establishing a support base there, it said, would be useful for China to ‘exert influence in the Indochina Peninsula in the future’.”
In similar vein, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute made this assessment: “There are no details available about what Chinese personnel, equipment or capabilities will be based there. Ban Keun’s operational value isn’t obvious, given the Chinese military can already operate from neighbouring Yunnan. Its significance may instead lie in establishing a persistent military presence in Laos and deepening ties with Lao armed forces.”
The CGSP also quoted another Chinese commentator, Rongping, who asserted this Lao base represents a different model than the PLA’s Djibouti and Cambodian facilities. This is true, for the Djibouti base primarily supports Chinese anti-piracy naval task groups operating in the Gulf of Aden. Of course, there is more to it than that, for the facility hosts a strong contingent of PLA Navy marines equipped with armoured vehicles, for instance. This gives the PLA a rapid reaction force in the Horn of Africa, able to respond quickly to crises in Africa or the nearby Middle East. The Djibouti base is also used to train PLA peacekeeping troops deploying to Africa.
Regarding Djibouti, the Pentagon, however, assessed that the Djibouti base has had minimal involvement in protecting Chinese citizens or investments, which was actually a stated purpose of the facility. The USA stated: “To date, the support base has not supported non-combatant evacuations and has not provided support to the ongoing Red Sea crisis. Instead, the facility has enabled persistent PLA regional presence under the auspices of support to counter-piracy and increasingly supports regional military diplomacy.”
The key difference about the Laos facility is that it is the first air force-specific base for the PLA outside China. The Chinese military will presumably rotate forces into the base, as well as maintain a forward-support presence there. This means the PLA will have a permanent and persistent presence in Laos.
Rongping also wondered whether China chose Laos only because Cambodia might have said no to such a facility on its own territory. Phnom Penh does not want to throw in its lot entirely with China, and it is hedging with the likes of the USA and Japan. Cambodia receives official security assistance from Japan, for instance.
This Cambodian facility is located at Ream Naval Base in the Gulf of Thailand. China and Cambodia opened their “joint support training center” there on 5 April 2025. China paid for a major expansion with new buildings and berths. Chinese warships have docked there, but Cambodia insists it is open to friendly navies too. This is accurate, as USS Cincinnati berthed there in January 2026, the first time a US Navy warship had visited the base since its renovation.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet said at the time of the joint base’s inauguration: “From this day forward, we expect that there will be various attacks and interpretations. I want to take this opportunity to clarify clearly that Cambodia, under the leadership of the Cambodian People’s Party government, has no intention – whether in the past, present or future – of violating its own constitution by allowing any country or military to establish an exclusive base on Cambodian soil.”
Interestingly, Cambodia has revived joint military exercises with the USA, after a decade-long suspension. Perhaps Beijing does not appreciate that Cambodia is hedging its security relations. Rongping warned that Cambodia, in attempting to maximise its gains from both China and the USA, “may actually be losing the trust of both sides”.
China participates in annual bilateral Golden Dragon exercises with Cambodia, and it also supplied a pair of Type 056 corvettes to the Royal Cambodian Navy. Even before the refurbished base opened, two Chinese warships had been spotted there on three separate rotations, indicating that China has prime access.
With a presence at Ream, China has access to the Gulf of Thailand, on top of its multiple bases in the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. With a new air base in Indochina, the PLA’s reach is definitely expanding.
The Chinese Global Times tabloid quoted Song Zhongping, a Chinese military affairs expert, as saying this air training center would help build a systematic talent training system for pilots, ground crew and other flight personnel. This will reduce Laos’ reliance on overseas-based training, “enabling independent talent cultivation rather than full reliance on overseas training”. It is understood that Lao troops currently typically travel to China, Russia or Vietnam for training.
It is possible the training base might include simulators too. Song added that the center would deepen practical exchanges between the two militaries, upgrading from simple equipment assistance to long-term integrated cooperation in talent training, joint exercises and equipment support.
The Global Times also asserted, “It also might help maintain stability in the Indochina Peninsula and Mekong River region, with both sides able to conduct joint search and rescue, border control and disaster relief aviation drills under the framework.”
The Pentagon, in its most recent report on China’s military issued in December 2025, noted: “China’s overseas military basing will be constrained by the willingness of potential host nations to support a PLA presence. Host nations are likely concerned about risks to sovereignty, regional and international perceptions, and relations with the United States and other countries when considering hosting a PLA facility.”
It continued, “The PLA is actively considering and planning for additional military facilities to support naval and air projection with associated ground security forces. It then listed places where China is “likely considered basing”. These were: Angola, Bangladesh, Burma, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.
It is notable that the USA did not mention Laos at all, which makes the new airbase even more of a surprise. The Pentagon did conclude, though, “The PLA is probably most interested in military access along the sea lines of communication in the Malacca Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and other areas in Africa and the Middle East.”
The USA said China is seeking overseas sites as part of a global logistics and basing network. These allow the PLA to project and sustain power at greater distances, just as the USA does all over the world. Of course, China’s network is still tiny and nascent in comparison with the American one. The Pentagon report added, “The purpose and operations performed at each facility are likely to be determined based on host-nation agreements and each location’s utility rather than the actual title of the facility.”
